What planned deepening? If you've ruled out the single market and the customs union, because basically you're a Brexit party bent on appeasing the far right, then you're not deepening anything. And there are no advantages of any sort to be had from kissing Trump's backside. So that's what Labour will do.
Convincing arguments on all points. It's worth noting that the President-Elect's USTR pick Jamieson Greer has advocated for bilateral trade deals with large, allied countries like "the U.K., India, Kenya and the Philippines".
Thankfully he is not a "MAGA" ideologue, has extensive trade diplomacy experience from establishing the North American USMCA trade pact, and has legal training from a firm with an international arm HQ'd in London. He will not expect the U.K. to choose between "economic freedom" and "European socialism", which may allow the Tories to moderate their position to align with Greer's more moderate 'America First' expectations whilst leaving Farage's Reform and GB News to espouse the MAGA worldview on the fringes of political debate.
That said, USTR Greer believes in the oxymoronic concept of "America First-multilateralism": allies putting American strategic interests before their own principles and self-interest. For this reason he isn't a fan of the EU's desire for strategic autonomy, disagreeing with them on economic foreign policy rather than economic domestic policy (i.e. welfare and labour). Specifically he dislikes their: respect for the WTO, esp over prioritisation of U.S. interests; putting ESG standards before pragmatism in trade negotiations; perception of the U.S. as a problematic trade partner rather than as an indispensable trade partner; it's refusal to positively discriminate in favour of U.S. industry; measures taken against "our digital trade companies... [and] our exports of agriculture", etc.
It will be easier for the Government to meet USTR Greer halfway on his AF-Multilateralist expectations, than it would to meet MAGA's expectations of comprehensively restructuring domestic economies in ways opposing Kier Starmer's own signature policies and manifesto promises.
The main bone of contention when it comes to AF-multilateralism will probably be on alignment or divergence with the U.S. on global green economic policies. Sure, the U.K. won't be expected to drop our own commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement nor expected to tank our intended alignment with the EU on carbon tax alignment, but USTR Greer hopes to see us wage a "war on global overcapacity", mainly on steel. Multilateral measures with North America on Chinese steel dumping would be a small political win for the Government, but that would soon be followed by more divisive U.S. expectations of measures against global overcapacity of EVs, batteries and solar panels - which of course China will portray as essential for the modernisation of the Global South and the mitigation of climate change. Would our Government really be prepared to put U.S.' strategic geopolitical interests ahead of the interests of the Global South and global decarbonisation? It remains to be seen.
What planned deepening? If you've ruled out the single market and the customs union, because basically you're a Brexit party bent on appeasing the far right, then you're not deepening anything. And there are no advantages of any sort to be had from kissing Trump's backside. So that's what Labour will do.
Convincing arguments on all points. It's worth noting that the President-Elect's USTR pick Jamieson Greer has advocated for bilateral trade deals with large, allied countries like "the U.K., India, Kenya and the Philippines".
Thankfully he is not a "MAGA" ideologue, has extensive trade diplomacy experience from establishing the North American USMCA trade pact, and has legal training from a firm with an international arm HQ'd in London. He will not expect the U.K. to choose between "economic freedom" and "European socialism", which may allow the Tories to moderate their position to align with Greer's more moderate 'America First' expectations whilst leaving Farage's Reform and GB News to espouse the MAGA worldview on the fringes of political debate.
That said, USTR Greer believes in the oxymoronic concept of "America First-multilateralism": allies putting American strategic interests before their own principles and self-interest. For this reason he isn't a fan of the EU's desire for strategic autonomy, disagreeing with them on economic foreign policy rather than economic domestic policy (i.e. welfare and labour). Specifically he dislikes their: respect for the WTO, esp over prioritisation of U.S. interests; putting ESG standards before pragmatism in trade negotiations; perception of the U.S. as a problematic trade partner rather than as an indispensable trade partner; it's refusal to positively discriminate in favour of U.S. industry; measures taken against "our digital trade companies... [and] our exports of agriculture", etc.
It will be easier for the Government to meet USTR Greer halfway on his AF-Multilateralist expectations, than it would to meet MAGA's expectations of comprehensively restructuring domestic economies in ways opposing Kier Starmer's own signature policies and manifesto promises.
The main bone of contention when it comes to AF-multilateralism will probably be on alignment or divergence with the U.S. on global green economic policies. Sure, the U.K. won't be expected to drop our own commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement nor expected to tank our intended alignment with the EU on carbon tax alignment, but USTR Greer hopes to see us wage a "war on global overcapacity", mainly on steel. Multilateral measures with North America on Chinese steel dumping would be a small political win for the Government, but that would soon be followed by more divisive U.S. expectations of measures against global overcapacity of EVs, batteries and solar panels - which of course China will portray as essential for the modernisation of the Global South and the mitigation of climate change. Would our Government really be prepared to put U.S.' strategic geopolitical interests ahead of the interests of the Global South and global decarbonisation? It remains to be seen.
It is really that much of a choice? The gains from reintegrating with the EU are so marginal that it’s hard to see how they could be worth squandering the opportunity Trump provides. https://backseatpolicycritic.substack.com/p/uk-comparative-advantage-brexit