Another result of crying wolf and then kicking the can down the road is additional cost for traders. They have to plan and invest for whatever the latest deadline is going to be and will often ship more product in advance of the deadline to avoid disruption. A nightmare for them and for trade statisticians!
Thank you. Wishing you a quick recovery. Investment in earthquake prevention measures is a similar problem to pandemics. Politically it is difficult to get rewarded by voters, but after the earthquake it is a golden opportunity to show off / capitalise on the disaster and promise everything.
For once, I slightly disagree with you, when you say re import control introduction “given the UK and EU food health regimes were directly equivalent immediately after exit; the EU and its member-states are a trusted regulator, so there probably wasn’t very much to worry about”
This is widely said, but (quoting now from my blog) it ignores the loss of participation in the complex structure or ‘eco-system’ that makes the single market work as such. This eco-system includes the EU Animal Disease Information System (ADIS) which operates a highly sophisticated 24/7 notification and monitoring system which tracks and reports outbreaks and spreads of animal diseases, assisting rapid response and containment. Amongst other components are the Trade Control Expert System (TRACES), which is concerned with the entire agri-food chain, contributing to ensuring that food is safe for consumption, and the European Foods Standards Agency (EFSA) which communicates scientific risk assessments relating to the food chain.
Since Brexit, the UK has ceased to be a member of all these bodies but has developed its own Import of Products, Animals, Food and Feed System (IPAFFS) and has also expanded the role of the pre-existing Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and Food Standards Agency (FSA). However, so far as I can understand, there was no agreement for full and reciprocal data sharing in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, so what sharing of information there is between UK and EU systems is unsystematic (e.g. UK representatives attending some meetings of EU bodies but without any official status) and less rapid than before Brexit. Rapid and reliable information is a key issue in this context, as even a few hours can make all the difference to containing a disease outbreak. As with the lorry queues, a small extra delay or friction in one part of a complex system can create major problems elsewhere.
I don’t pretend to have any expertise in the details of these systems or exactly how they work. But it is clear just from the sources I consulted to write this, some of which I’ve linked to, that what are now national systems cannot fully replicate membership of EU transnational systems. Yet major parts of trade and supply chains continue to operate across the GB-EU border. So to argue that there’s no more risk than before Brexit is fallacious. Certainly the BVA's Senior Vice-President James Russell, who presumably does know exactly how these systems work, is unequivocal that lack of access to EU databases and systems increases risks and makes it more important to have the border checks in place that would mitigate these risks.
Disagreement is good! And you are of course right that there was an immediate difference in the applied regime the moment the UK left the EU's regulatory architecture. I just don't think that -- at the moment of leaving -- the risk levels were particularly high, or that they were deserving of effectively breaking the border completely. Over time, those risk levels have increased (bad people start to take advantage) and I think you can argue the balance of friction/risk now requires more intervention.
Another result of crying wolf and then kicking the can down the road is additional cost for traders. They have to plan and invest for whatever the latest deadline is going to be and will often ship more product in advance of the deadline to avoid disruption. A nightmare for them and for trade statisticians!
Thank you. Wishing you a quick recovery. Investment in earthquake prevention measures is a similar problem to pandemics. Politically it is difficult to get rewarded by voters, but after the earthquake it is a golden opportunity to show off / capitalise on the disaster and promise everything.
For once, I slightly disagree with you, when you say re import control introduction “given the UK and EU food health regimes were directly equivalent immediately after exit; the EU and its member-states are a trusted regulator, so there probably wasn’t very much to worry about”
This is widely said, but (quoting now from my blog) it ignores the loss of participation in the complex structure or ‘eco-system’ that makes the single market work as such. This eco-system includes the EU Animal Disease Information System (ADIS) which operates a highly sophisticated 24/7 notification and monitoring system which tracks and reports outbreaks and spreads of animal diseases, assisting rapid response and containment. Amongst other components are the Trade Control Expert System (TRACES), which is concerned with the entire agri-food chain, contributing to ensuring that food is safe for consumption, and the European Foods Standards Agency (EFSA) which communicates scientific risk assessments relating to the food chain.
Since Brexit, the UK has ceased to be a member of all these bodies but has developed its own Import of Products, Animals, Food and Feed System (IPAFFS) and has also expanded the role of the pre-existing Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and Food Standards Agency (FSA). However, so far as I can understand, there was no agreement for full and reciprocal data sharing in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, so what sharing of information there is between UK and EU systems is unsystematic (e.g. UK representatives attending some meetings of EU bodies but without any official status) and less rapid than before Brexit. Rapid and reliable information is a key issue in this context, as even a few hours can make all the difference to containing a disease outbreak. As with the lorry queues, a small extra delay or friction in one part of a complex system can create major problems elsewhere.
I don’t pretend to have any expertise in the details of these systems or exactly how they work. But it is clear just from the sources I consulted to write this, some of which I’ve linked to, that what are now national systems cannot fully replicate membership of EU transnational systems. Yet major parts of trade and supply chains continue to operate across the GB-EU border. So to argue that there’s no more risk than before Brexit is fallacious. Certainly the BVA's Senior Vice-President James Russell, who presumably does know exactly how these systems work, is unequivocal that lack of access to EU databases and systems increases risks and makes it more important to have the border checks in place that would mitigate these risks.
Chris Grey
Sorry, none of the links in that comment have copied through
Disagreement is good! And you are of course right that there was an immediate difference in the applied regime the moment the UK left the EU's regulatory architecture. I just don't think that -- at the moment of leaving -- the risk levels were particularly high, or that they were deserving of effectively breaking the border completely. Over time, those risk levels have increased (bad people start to take advantage) and I think you can argue the balance of friction/risk now requires more intervention.